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GENEVA
ROAD TO PEACE
by Joseph Clark

Geneva: Road to Peace
By JOSEPH CLARK
On many monuments and churches in Geneva you read the words:
From the Darkness the Light.
Who can deny that the Geneva conferu1cc, wbich brought together President Eisenhower, Prerniws Bulganin and Fame and Prime
Minister Eden, cast a light which pierced the darkness of "the
&Id War"?
Estimates vary about how much was actually achieved by the
Big Four wn£erence. Some might dispute a headlint in tht Daily
S&ch, of London, after the conference: REJOICEI THE DAYS OF
WAR ARE PASTI
But even the cautious statement of President Eisenhower on his
return from Geneva, said: "There is evidence of a new frien&incss
in the world." He added something that is quite new for the Administration-that any negotiations must involve mutual concessions.
British Foreign Minister Harold Maurnillan said jovially when he
was back in London: "There sin? gmna be any war."
French Premier Faure said the codrenee "will have a happy
influence" on future events.
Soviet Premier Bulganin deckred the conferen= contributed "to
the relaxation of tensions between
He also said Geneva "opeus
a new era in the relations among the four powers, and not only
among them."
Best of d we like the comment of an Iowa fawho was having
his own *rconference" with some visiting Soviet farm experts, while
the Big Four met in Geneva.
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"People out here," the Iowan said, "and probably in the rest of
the country, too, arc sick and tired of talk about war and international tension. We art williag to do just about everything to get rid
of it. If getting to know sarntthmg h u t the Russians is necessary,
then we want to do tha~"
At the bar in the huge Maisw De La P m (How of the Press)
a reporter .from a mid-west paper asked me what I thought abut
the codcreace. This was just after the &st day. I said it lwked
he:and noted that President B i o w e r a
h said it was going h e ,
''Just words," my colleague said, "the Russians haven't given up
their aim of world conqu~t"There it &C
argument M i n d
nearly ten years of cold war. However, now for the first time in ten
years M c a n and Soviet heads of government wcxc sitting down together. Can we have peace with the Russians? Here's how President
Eisenhower answerad that w the third day of the conhence:
"I have spoken to each m e m k of the Russian delegation. I wish
to make it c h it is my belief h a t they art as mrnestly desirous
of W
g peace as we are."
Now, that's a lot different from what we've heard ever since the
end of the war. One correspondent for a big metropolitan newspaper
said in all seriousness that Eisenhower was spreading "mmmunist
propaganda:' Which gives you an idea of how unprepared the big
business press was for the conciliatory atmosphere and spirit of good
f&g at Geneva In fact, up till the h t day their favorite word w;ts
"deadlcck."
These correspondents bad fallen for their own omria abut immi4eot and inevitable war, A most notable result of the Geneva conference was that it e x p d the terrible hoax to which wr country
had been subjected for so marry years-the hoax of imminent and inevitable war, and of an external menace.
Naturally, h e Geneva conference didn't settle all the Wcrences
and wnflicts that have arisen in the last ten years. Six days is a
short rime to undo the: harm of ten tima
days. Here we propst
to discuss the unsettled questions and examine rhc pokbilities of
getting satisfactory results. But first let's sce how the Geneva conference came about in the h t place and why it didn't take place sooner.
Btfore the Geneva confuence, this Jdy, there had not h e n a meet-

.

ing of the American and Soviet heads of state since Jdy,r*
Ccrtainly it wasn't for lack of difhences md codicol By the end of 1 9
serious disputes had developed between our country and the USS&.
abwt Germany, about Korea, and about atomic weapons.
On May + 1gq8, our ambassador in Moscow, Gen. Walter Bedell
Smith, informed Soviet Foreign Minister Molotov that he deplored the
bad relations. h d o r Smith said: "As far as the United States
is concerned, the d m always remains open for exhaustive discw
sion and s e t b e n t of our di&renux!'
Five days later, on May g, Molotov replied. The Soviet Foreign
Minister suggested "discussion and settlement of Mefences existing
between us." But Washington rejected this proposal and the door,
which Smith said was open, c h c d with a bang.
Less than two weeks later, on May 17,Soviet Premier Stalin replied to an open letter from Henry Wallace, at that time still a
supporter of Rocscvtlt's policy of AmericanSoviet friendship. The
former vict-praident urged that capitalism and socialism live t~
gether in pea= and differences be gelded through negotiations.
Staiin answered Wallam: "The caexisttnce of these systems and
the- pceful d c m t n t of di&renccs between the USS.R, and the
USA. are not only possible but absolutely necessary in the interests of
universal peace."
One of the most imprtant correspondents covering the Geneva
parley was jam^ R-n,
chief of the N. Y. Times Washington
Bureau. Which brings to mind a part of the record in which Reston
himsel£ was a participant.
Toward the end of 19,
Reston sent a series of questions to Stalin.
Ln one of them he asked if the Sovier Premier would agree to "diplomatic conversations with representatives of the new Eisenhower administration, looking toward the possibility of a meeting between
yourself and General Eisenhower on casing world tensions?"
On December 21, Restan got a reply from Stalin in one word:
Yes. But from the White House? Silence.
Then Mdenkov tmk eke, after Stalin died. On March 15, 1 % ~
I was sititing in the press box with my American, British and Fmch
colleagues, at a meeting of the Supreme Soviet. Premier Malenkov
was speaking and he said:

~

"At the present time there is no disputed or unsolvtd problem
which cannot be solved by peaceful means, on the h i s of m u d
agreement of the interested commies. This refers to our relations
with all states, including our relations with tht United Statcs of
America!'
Just a few 4

s Iattr, Prime Minister Churchill made it much

more specific. H e suggested a meeting
the summit.n And on
May I I, shody More I ldt the U.S.S.R., Prauda came out with a big
story welcoming Churchill's ~roposal. Two years and more pasgcd
without a meeting at the summit, ahhouqh Churchin proposed it time
and again. Winston Churchill explained in Commons that while the
Soviet Unim had accepted his proposal Eisenhower had vetted it.
Clearly, the iduenm of McCarthy and Knowland was poisoning
not only the domcstic atmosphere but also far&@ poliw. There must
be no deals with the Soviet Union, they thundered. Thev ca1fed for
"liberation" of the European Pcoplc's Democracies and China. They
argued for preventive war, and the Eisenhower Administration a m e
perilously dost to repeating their slogans when it urged '%liberationu
and "massive rttaliatio~"

Despite all this, a series of

events

took place which brought

about an easinp of world tensions, thou& thh was intersnerml with
the Tndochina crisis of r o w and the Formosa crids this year.
In the summer of x ~ q the
,
terrible fiahting in Rorea was ended bv
ncmtiations. A year later the last shootins war in the world ended
in Tnddina, dso through negotiations. Those neptiations algo taak

and China participated as a p a t power for the first
time in that I= conference.
Earlier this year, the long deadlocked Austrian state treaty was
signed. And in Bandung, Indonesia, 3 Asian and African countries
got together and agreed on peaceful coexisrence. It was at Baadung
that China's Premier Chou En-lai made his dramatic proposal fox
direct negotiations with our country to d e the Far East crisis.
There was a reconciliation between the Soviet Uniw and Y u p
slavia. And the Soviet Union took the occasion to emphasize the m
dalist principle of non-intervention by &list
states in the affairs
of other countrie. This principle had also k e n stressed in five-pint
place at Geneva

I

coexistence agreements between China and India, Burma and India,
and other Asian lands.
Then India's Prime Minister Nehru toured the U.S.S.R. Out of
this visit came a big demonstration for peaceful coexisten= and nonintervention of countries in the internal affairs af others.
But all these events did not just fall fram the skies. Something
new entered the field of diplomacy and world a h i r s . The people,
the plain ordinary John Docs and Mary Does, of all lands, were making their influence felt as never More in history. What was achieved
at the summit w a s made possible by what happened at the base.
On a world scale, the forces of peace were strong than the war forces.
An organized pace movement atose in every country which had
a tremendous impact an the governments of the world. Think back
to the critical situation in 1950. The Korean fighting broke out and
many said the war must and wiH spread, It was five years ago that
the Christmas issue of Newsweek magazine asked tbis question : "Is
this the last Christmas of peace on tarth?" Its answer was: "Yes."
But millions of people were at that time signing the Stockholm
petition to ban atomic bombs. Millions of people were also demanding peaceful negotiations to bring a b u t a cease-fire in Korea. In our
own country, thousands of Etters 0oaded Washington and came to
the editors of local newspapers with this demand.
And still more miIIions all over the world signed petitions and held
meetings and agitated for a big-power meeting at the summit. Steadily
the demand grew for toplevel talks. During the British electian
campaign this was a central issue. The Tories vied with the Labor
Party as champions of a meeting at the summit. This was a great
tribute to the common sense of the plain people who had k e n demanding this long before their leaders agreed to it.
Pressure for such a meeting grew in our country, roo. ID order to
forestall such a meeting, Secretary of State Dulles tried to pull a fast
one. He ordered the release of the Yalta papers.
DulIes' strategy w a s as simple as it was nasty. T h e McCarthyim
had lanq been using "Yalta" as a sort of dirty word with which to
smear Roosevelr and the Demcxrats. So Dulfts released the papers,
hoping to discredit the idea of a summit meeting. Since most postRmsevelt Democratic leaders no longer supported FDR's policy of
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AmericanSoviet friendship, the field seemed wide open for the Dulles
strategy.
But thc release of the Y a h papers boomeranged. Dulls had
reckwed without one thin-puhr
sentiment in our country favored
a toplevel meeting. The Gallup poll had shown
percent in favor of
a meeting of the Big Four heads of government The p p I e were
way ahcad of their socalled Ieaders.
Meanwhile, some of the shrewder Dcrnocrats, including chairman
Walter George of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, finally
awoke to the Dulles scheme and to what the American people
actually wanted. So Senator George followed up the release of the
Yalta papers with a propad for a Big Four parley of the heads of
government.
The rest is very recent history. It includes n last-minute decision
by Eisenhower to hdp out his Tory friends in the British election.
So, finally he went along with Bulganin's agreement for a Big Four
toplevel meeting,
What the Geneva Big Four mecting accomplished is symbolized
by the picture on thc cover of this pamphlet. The heads of the
American, Soviet, British and French governments came together as
friends, not enemies. A new spirit of rooperation and mutual confidence was indicated.
From a practical point of view the Geneva conference decided to
convene a mecting of the Big Four Foreign Ministers on October
to take up the directives agreed upon by thc heads of state.
A dramatic development that came right after the Geneva conference was the announcement by the Chinese and American governments that they were going to start negotiations in Geneva, This
was follow~d,wen before the negotiations opened, by the release by
the Peking government of eleven US. airmen. Qearly, the Geneva
spirit was spilling over ro the Far East. The crisis there was a resuIt
of a policy which gave the Knowland and McCarthy representatives
nf F o r m a a dangerbus influence over Far Eastern affairs.
At Cairo, during the war, at Potsdam and later our government
had recognized that Formosa was Chinese. And haw long can the
fiction be maintained that Chiang Kai-shek speaks for China? New
tiations between China and the U.S.were clearly in order. And they

n

wen indeed initiated during the Big Four meeting in Geneva.

.

Each of the four heads of government-Eisenhower, Bulganin,
E h and Faure-has stressed the new atmosphere mated at Geneva.
But still there remain sharp d;ffcrenmswhich rhc heads of state agreed
to turn over to their foreign ministers for further study, negotiation
and solution. Let's take up the three p i n t s on which the Geneva
conference issued directives to the foreign ministers. Let's see what
the differences are and whether solutions are possible which will
satisfy the interests of all.
r. EUROPEAN SECURITY AND GERMANY

Nobody has to be remhded that Europe was ravaged by fire and
sword for centuries. Whatever the other causes of those world wars,
no one will dispute the specid part which Geman militarism played
as an a$grtSSOr. And our country was involved in each world war.
The dispute between the Weseera heads of state and the Soviet
premier can be summed up very simply on tbis issue. The Wesrern
position, in which our government took the lead, was that German
"reunification" must have priority over any considerations of European security. The Soviet position was that security and protection
of aI1 against any attack is a basic condition for reunification of Germany.
At the heart of the malIed Western position was the rearmament of Wcst Germany and incorporation of the new Wehrmacht
in NATO. A unified Germany would, in thii position, also be remilitarized and become part of the NATO military alliance.
Turning to the record we find rhat on June q,1949,shortly after
the North Atlantic Treaty was signal, the Soviet Union protested
that it had been excluded. And later, the Swict governmenr, on March
31, sgtii, sent us a note proposing "to join with the interested governm a t s in mamining the question af the Soviet Union's participation
in the North Atlantic Treaty."
This brings ta mind a series of compromise proposals made bath
by the British and Soviet governments at Geneva. Bulganin several
times went out of his way to stress that he was not proposing to break
up NATO. Instead, he suggested agreements on consultation and nonaggression between NATO and the Warsaw pact. [The latter was

,
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formed as a counterweight ro NATO by the Soviet government and
the East European People's Democracies six years after NATO was
crcatcd.]

Bulganin proposed this as part of a first stage for solving the pr&
Ian of German unification and &-European security. In the h a 1
stag^, therc would be a collective security pact of all Europe, including
a united Germany and the USA. This would then be able to repface
the military allianceeNAT0 and Warsaw-now facing one anorher
in Europe.
Sir Anthony Edm then proposed a five-power security pact to include the Big Four and a united Germany. Eden showed he was
ready for compromise in his smtcmcnt that this pact might be mlargcd
to include other European states. And Bulganin showed he was ready
for compromise in saying he was willing to consider fewer than all
che states of Europe in the paa.
Many in Geneva were startled by President Eisenhower's explanation that NATO was formed to prevent the rise of Hitlerism in Germany. No one was more surprised than the West Germans. It was
espdally startling in view of a dispatch sent from Bonn, Germany,
by the Associated Press at the very time when Eisenhower was making
that statement. The dispatch, as it appeared in the Christian Science
Mmitor (July w),stated:
"The West German government has informed parliament of its
plan to take over the American-heed international spy network
htaded by former Lt. Gen. Reinhard Gcblen.
'Tt will b m e the West German federal indigence service, operating on both sides of the Iron Curtah,
"Financed for the last tight years with up to six mittion dollars
of United States funds, the GeHm organization has
agents,
some operating as far east as Siberia."
What a strange way of preventing the rise of Hirlerism! Lt. Gcn.
Gelden of the Nazi High Cotnmand operated intelIigcncc for=
against American troops who fought under General Eisenhower a
little more than ten years ago. And Lt. Gen. Gehlen was Hider's
most trusted operative against the Soviet Union. His Hitleritc network, which was "American-financed," is now part of Adcnaucr's
forces, and is &ng proposed for inclusion in NATO.

Is it any wonder that right after the Geneva conference, the Social
&mcrats and the trade union federation of West Grmany undertaok a new egort to bar the incorporation of the proposed new Wchrmacht in NATO? These- German trade unions have for ten years
been backed by the AFL and CIO, fmancially and otherwise, Shouldn't
American trade unionists pay some heed to what rheu German brothers are saying now? These German unionists are warning that revived militarism would h disastrous for free trade unions.
HOWcan Germany be united, the West German workers ask, if
we insist that not only West Germany, but a united Germany must:
became part of NATO? The question before us, the Social Demoaats said, is to discuss a basis for reunification under which West
Germany wuId not h committed to NATO and East Germany
would not be committed to Warsaw.
The manner in which the Geneva conference tied together the
questions of European security and German unification shows there
are braad areas for compromise on both sides and solution af this
Jificult problem is possible.
a.

DISARMAMENT

For ten ymrs, the costs of armaments have pressed more and more
heavily on people everywhere, The m n e v we have spent on financing
the cold war could have provided decent housing for everv American
family. It could have built enough ahnols to eliminate a11 sub-stand3rd educational facilities. It could have provided the recreational facilities and supervised youth activities to help combat the terrible
m u r q of iuvenile delinquency which has mounted steadily during
the years of the cold war. It cadd have provided an effective flood
control program.
Across every issue arising in the past-war world has k e n the
shadow of the A-bombs and Hhrnb, True, the forces of peace have
proved stronger than the hrccs of war even in the most critical postwar years. But as long as there was a Cold War, it could nurture
atomic destruction at mmt future date.
That is why the peace movement, church assemblies, Pope Pius XI1
--all have appealed far banishing the horror bomb menace,

At Geneva, the four powers agreed to spur the efforts of their
representatives on the UN disarmament submmission. Their rep
rescntatives in that body, as well as the foreign ministers, are instructed to take into account the proposals made by the heads of gov-
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ernment.
Great attention was g v e n in the world press to President Emhawergs proposal that the US, and U.SS,R. exchange defense installation blue prints. AEo, that they sponsor aerial flights over each
other's amtries "from end ro end."
After the dust had sertled somewhat, the question was how much
had this contributed to disarmament? James Reston, of the N.Y.
Time$ (July 22, 1 % ~ ) ~noted :
First, "it was generally reqardtd as unrealistic."
Second. "it is illem1 under United States laws."
Third, it is a proposal "which the other side knew in advance had
no chance of being accepted."
And fourth, the plan, "apparently was not explored in any detail,
if at all, with Con~ressionalleaders, who make the laws."
What was extraordinary about Eisenhower's speech was that while
it was an the s u b k t of disarmament, it contained no propnsal for arms
reduction or limitation at all. In fact, the President stated that the
measures which he was proposing would be ineffective in the checkine or insnection of nuclear weapons.
The President said he would consent to arms reduction or bans
only if inspection or testing could be effective. Then he said:
'We have pot h e n able to discover any xientitic or other inqnection method which would make certain of the elimination of nuclear
weapons." In other words, he is saying that his own proposal brinvs
no closer a method of eliminating nuclear weapons.
Evidence of the new and better relations between our wuntw and
the USSR was seen in the Soviet attitude toward the Eisenhower
proposal. The Soviet leaders did not reject or rebuff it even though
it does not include any reference to banning atomic bombs at reducinrr conventional arms. Thcy suggested that it be considerd, along
with atI other propasaIs, as a serious contribution.
In other words, even areas where there are great differences ean
become areas of agreement in the new climate of Soviet-American

relations. That is why friendship between the two most powerful
+
countries in the world is so important to all of us,
It is interesting, by way of contrast, that Prernicr Bulganin accepted a proposal of the Bandung conference to ban all nudear wcap
on test explosions. This is something that definitely can bc chtclrtd.
It was originally proposed by William Randolph Hearst to Marshal
Zhukw. Mow, it pops up in a S o d proposal to which we had no

p&tivc respon~.
Another interesting sidetight was the Soviet acceptance of the
Eisenhower pmpasal to contribute atomic materials to a world atomic
pool for peace.
Premier Bulganin also repeated the Soviet plan for disarmament
and the prohibition of nudear weapons which his government originally propod on May 10. Prim Minister Eden, in commenting
on this at Geneva, noted that it brought the East and West much closer
together on this issue.
The Soviet Union accepted the Western proposab on levels of
armaments. It accepted thc Western proposals of a stage-by-stage
approach ro banning nuclear weapons. And the Soviet plan mnmins
a detailed system of international inspection to enforce a nucltar
weapon ban as we11 as the reduction of conventional armaments.
It is not generally realized that this Soviet plan on inspec~onand
mntrol d m not provide for any veto in the day-to-day operations
of the international inspection agency. The internationaI agency is
authorized to conduct inspections ar any time by a simple majority
vote and it must be allowed a m s to all "objects of control."
The issue, from tht viewpoint of our best interests, is not disarmament versus inspection. The salution of this problem will require
disarmament A N D inspection. To pit one against the other is to bar
the way to what the world and our country n e e d e a ban on nuclear
weapons, lifring of the armaments burden, along with security for all.
3. DEVELOPMENT

OF CONTACT BEIWEEN

EAST AND WEST
Of breaching benefit in developing mutual good feeling was the
agreement of the Big Four to bring about:

r. Elimination of barriers to free communicatio~.and trade bca d West
a Freer contacts and exchanges.
It may still come as a shock to many Americans that our government has erected barriers between pmples. Many may bc surprised
to Icarn that at present the Soviet Union sells us ten times as much
goods as we sell them. And we arc sure mast people wodd be
a
d to learn that as late as ISI, when we had cut off practicaliy
all exports to the thevict Union, they were still selling us such strategic
materials as manganese and chrome, Those p u r b from the
U.S.S.R. went into tanks, d e r y and other ordnance. But at that
very time we were banning the sale of penicillin, p s s m g e r cars, tractors and fishing boats, dong with a thowand other such item9, w the
U.S.S.R. and any of the other h a l i s t lands.
Similarly with regard to travel and cultural excbangc between East
and West. Many Americans will be surprised to learn &at ordinary
tourist travel is b d y under way between Europe and the USSR.
And h e newspapermen, c o n p m e n , sportsmen, farmers and students who have visited the Soviet Union haw not been asked far
their fingerprints or told to sign a statement that they travel at their
own risk, as is the case under the McCarran-Walter Act.
It is important for every American to know how much our
country's name has sdered abroad because of the passport ban we've
placed on Paul Robeson. Tories from London and Catholics in Pram
told me they want to see R o b n in Othello and hear him sing.
The wonderful weIcome which the Midwest and Far West farmers
gave to the Soviet farm delegation here and the fine reception our
farmers got in the USSR. show how ordinary people want to brcak
down barriers to East-Wet friendship. AFL President George M a y
is out of step with his own membership when he opposes the exchange
of l a h r delegations. And Democratic Senator Ellender scored a
b&ye when he went to Mmcow and there sent a message to Gaorge
Many urging l a h r ddegations to exchange visits. "They might see
things in a different light," Ellender said to the AFL leaders.
Which brings up the whole question of the witchhunt and antiCommunist hysteria. One of the moat terrible consequena of the
cold-war foreign policy of the Truman and Eisenhower Adminismatween East

tions was the witchhunt. Only now dots it become clear what a heavy
price our country paid for a disastrous foreign policy. Entire ch&
of our most cherished traditions and constitutional guarantees were
cut away under the pretext of an "external menace" and the hoax of
a "world communist conspiracy."
This was the meat on which McCarthyism fed. How happy people
all over the world were to repeat a phrase they had heard--that McCarthyism had become MeCarthywasm. That s y m b o l i d an ending
of the Cold War to them.
But can it be said that McCadyism is already a thing of the past?
How can it, when right after Geneva we read reports in all European papers about che Un-American investigation of actors and
theatrical figures for their "subversive" connections.
McCarthyism is srill with us, though McCarthy hirnstlf is dik
credited, as long as men and women are jailed for heir political b
Iiefs under the Smith and the McCarran laws. Elizabeth GurIty
FIynn, yo years a leader of American labor, is now in prison under the
Smith Act along with many others. The texrible irony about this
is that Miss Flynn and her =workers championed the idea of a
"meeting at the summit" when both the Truman and then the Eisenhower Adrninistrarion bitterly opposed it.
But observe how history has vindicated those who said negotiations between East and West are both possible and necessary; how
those who demanded a big power conference were correct, while those
who sponsored the Cold War were harming our munay's interests.
The cold war was profitable for a tiny minority. Wall Street
hrrns, which had made TO billion dollars profit annually after taxes
during World War II, raised that to a6 billion a year during the
Cold War.
But at Geneva the voice of the people proved irresistible. The
dunand for peace crept in through every door, every window and
every crevice of the Palace of the Nations. h was a voice which said
mankind will tolerate war na more. Geneva was a triumph for the
idea of p d u l cwxistence.
How big a part the American people played in bringing abut
the present improvement of the world situation could be seen in the
popular protest at every phony crisis m k d up by the war patty.

.
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Testimony to this is giwn by Walar
Herald-Tribune drlmn (Aug, 2)
h e n the threat of war over such an absurdity as Quuwy ad&&tm
which was the trigger
that get off the Ammian rtvulsian a@h@s
-tbird World War."
h that same column, Lipprnann confirms that '*even as h laat
January" President Eisenhower "felt mmpdd ta athan [tb
war party) considerably+"
It ww
Geneva was a triumph lor the idea of eeac$ul
not a "sixday wonder." It brought abut wonduful h qin
~&X~
days, but wbat happened in the ten years bdorc madc Geneva p
sible. The real origin of Geneva was in the great victory over Wixlerism in World War II which profoundly dtcrd rehiom among
the power& Lt wasl a victory of American-Soviet cooperah A d
after that victory every &rt to insrig.ate another World War m
up against hnew relations. Above all, they came up asainst the
people everywhere who wanted no such war.
How wise the people were when they s u p p o d a Big Four
meeting even though the Ahhimation in Washington opposed i t
How wise the people were when they a p d great hopes &at the
Geneva meeting would succeed although the Administration warnad
against such h o p and poured cold water on such expectations.
And now once more h e Administration is trying to curb the mthusiasm of tht peoplt about the spirit of C;eawa. On August a5
the newspapers p u b h d a speech by Resident E i d o w e r at Philadelphia in which he cautioned against the pop& hopes aroused by
Geneva. James Reston said in the N. Y. Timeb:
"The Eisenhower Administration has reached a policy decision
to put a brakc on the optimism c r d by the Big Four conference
last month in Geneva!'
But the need today is not for a brake but for a spur to the Geneva
spirit. If the popular expeaations and demands in this matter are
impressed on Washington, then the spirit of Gcneva will &our&.
Geneva was the &st big step in ending the #ld War. And as
Americans remain d m and s p k out for patient negotiations, on
a t m w a y street, their will for peace will prove decisive.
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